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February 26, 2007

Miller and Slater 1-4

Dynamics of positioning

Miller and Slater discuss the ways in which the Internet has enabled Trinidadians to develop understandings of their specific identities and agency and the position of Trinidad in relation to ‘others’. The authors approach the dynamics of (re) positioning within the framework of global flows (they refer to Castells’, but conspicuously do not mention Appadurai’s global “scapes “, which I think would have been quite useful to their arguments); within this framework, the positions of Trinidadians as individuals and of Trinidad as their nation and defining/unifying entity are engaged in a dogged fight to be seen, understood, and successful on the international stages created through the Internet. At the level of kinship, the authors describe Trinidadians’ use of email, ICQ, chat, and Trini-oriented websites to reclaim, maintain, and expand connections among diasporic families. Rather than forming Trini enclaves outside of Trinidad, at least in the case of UK Trinis, the Internet was used primarily to keep in touch with family and friends in Trinidad and to allow them to continue socializing in typically “Trini” ways (eg. the online “lime).
What I found most interesting is the repositionings of Trinidad and Trini identity in the context of Internet communication technologies. Trini-centered and Trini-created websites represent and replicated key aspects of Trini history (Carnival, calypso, steeldrum) and social structure (the “lime”), contrary to the predictions of many Internet researchers who foresaw the weakening of national identities in the context of the Internet. While early on, Trinidadians participated in regionalized Carribean online environments, until they reached a critical mass of online Trinidadians to create and sustain uniquely Trini online communities. The authors describe Trinidadians as highly aware that they are meting the rest of the world online as Trinis, anxious that Trinidad lags behind the developed world, surprised by the world’s ignorance of Trinidad, and confidant in their ability to compete in the global Internet and IT sphere and in the Internet as the ideal sphere in which to assert their identity as a developed first-world nation.

As a side note, I’m a little troubled by the authors’ repeated reference to Malinowski’s description of the “kula ring”; without going into too much depth, I believe the comparison between Trobriand Islanders’ exchange of prestige items and Trinidadians’ online presence is somewhat tenuous. Mentioning it once or twice as a show of anthropological knowledge would have been fine with me, but the authors’ repeated comparison of Trinidadians’ online activity to the kula ring gift exchange does little do bolster their argument and much to suggest that they are associate Trinidadians’ with a “primitive” form of exchange. If their point, as I understand it, is one about the exchange of symbolic goods, there are other authors with less historically racist baggage than Malinowski whose work they could rely more heavily upon (Bordieu perhaps?). I think that failing to fully expound upon their use of the kula ring metaphor is irresponsible. At several points the authors admit to having begun their project with false assumptions about the educational level and Internet savvy of the Trinidadians they encountered, and their unexamined reliance on the kula ring metaphor (among other things) suggests that they never fully abandoned some of their preconceptions.

February 19, 2007

Paper proposal

i'm not confident that this proposal really reflects the amount of time I've already spent on this topic, but I'm sure the final version of the paper will...

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February 12, 2007

Fischer Ch 1-4

Fischer’s argument for the rise and fall of rural telephony (or at least domestic subscription in rural areas) is based on a number of factors, which in combination make a compelling argument. Fischer paints none too flattering a picture of AT&T. Though Fischer’s language is gentler, the corporation essentially comes off as a money-hungry monster determined to crush all competition even at the cost of its own lost revenue, a manicured poodle barking up the wrong tree, and a classist, short-sighted bigot who didn’t grasp even half the power of his own product. Though he asks the question of whether industry skepticism retarded the diffusion of the telephone or sluggish sales discouraged the industry, Fischer’s own opinion on the matter is fairly evident. Fischer’s notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy of rural telephone usage (after the era of competition, AT&T largely ignored the rural market for perceived lack of interest and profitability, which in part caused the initially high demand for service to taper off) demonstrates the power of marketing decisions, especially with a product as important as the telephone (and I’d find it hard to believe that AT&T didn’t know how important their product was). Though the consumers quickly saw the benefits and uses of telephone service, the exclusionary attitudes of AT&T toward rural customers discouraged its diffusion. Fischer’s comparison of phone subscription (usage data would have been nice, though he recognizes that very little is available) with car purchases bolsters his argument for the power of both marketing and consumer choice. Compared to the elitist business of AT&T, the introduction of the cheap cars to the market, with accompanying broad-based advertising campaigns, the novelty and usefulness of the car, and subsidized road-building projects to encourage driving, there was hardly a contest as to which (telephone or car) came quickly to be seen as a necessary and worthwhile investment. Fischer’s argument is a strong one, though he is right in acknowledging the limitations of the available data in representing public opinion about the telephone and phone companies. Though comprising only a small part of the chapter, his anecdotes from interviews with elderly Americans, especially those describing the awe inspired by cars and their opening of a “whole new way of life”, do much to fill this gap.

February 05, 2007

Douglas

A few plausible ideas of how the early history of broadcasting might have turned out differently:
1) the inventors
Douglas emphasizes the importance of three factors to the success of wireless’s early development: a strong business model and financial backing, media savvy, and scientific/technical expertise. She describes Marconi as embodying the first two, and compensating for his lack of the latter by borrowing and adapting the work of others and through tenacious experimentation. His international business goal for wireless was to develop a monopoly on wireless telegraphy apparatus and service to numerous countries, but his foreignness, lack of scientific knowledge, and insistence on non-intercommunication between his apparatus and other wireless ones ultimately outweighed his money, charm, and corporate drive.
Fessenden, on the other hand, was never described as a shrewd business or media man, but had extensive training and knowledge of electrical engineering and focused his work on wireless telephony and transmission of the human voice. Pupil of Edison, he was a pioneer of continuous wave transmission with his use of the alternator, but his work with NESCO faltered through a combination of bad luck and bad business and never figured out how to turn much of a profit.
Douglas describes DeForest as having the best feel for the public potential of wireless of all the early inventors, crediting him for developing the idea of broadcasting for public entertainment. But DeForest never made the press believe him or even really like him, and despite the importance of his audion, was a somewhat unsavory character who allowed himself to be a puppet to shady Wall Street stock scammers.
And finally, John Stone Stone, well-respected electrical engineer developer of the automatic telephone switchboard, was a man of science who never focused his attention on the business side of things but was central to the development of tuning.
Douglas repeatedly argues that Marconi was the early inventor who was by far best at striking the critical balance between business, press, and technology, but he was not entirely successful. Yet his pursuit of international monopoly power hurt his courtship with the American press and public. Without attempting to rewrite history, things might have turned out differently had the other inventors, all of whom surpassed Marconi in scientific and technical ability, had recognized the importance of a coherent business model and the cultivation of a positive relationship with the American media.
2) the Titanic
If the captain of the Titanic had acted more responsibly and turned off the ship’s engines in the midst of the iceberg field, as did the captain of the Halifax, Congress might have been able to hold off regulating wireless usage and amateur operators and their organizations might have continued to gain political strength, might not have been relegated to an undesirable chunk of the spectrum, and may have in some way effected the ways in which spectrum use was and is allocated.
3) World War I
If WWI hadn’t happened, the government wouldn’t have been able to call for a moratorium on patents for the privately owned wireless components which they then used to develop more coherent and efficient wireless systems for use during the war, nor would they have developed RCA after the war and thus effectively created a state-sanctioned communications monopoly which determined the course of broadcasting in the decades after the end of this book.