Life and Data Need Not Be Numbers
In the late 1970’s, W. Russell Neuman argued that Raymond Williams' Television could not qualify as the definite review of television in society because William’s work failed to “gather data to test ideas” and therefore lacks sophistication and the focus necessary to influence future television research. Essentially, Neuman is arguing that since Williams did not collect “proper” data his work cannot be influential. I disagree with Neumann’s argument because the trope of “proper data” cannot be used to disqualify a form of research. First, Neuman, or any other individual, is not in a position to define “proper data” for the entire field of communications. Second, Williams’ research is supported by data and evidence. Finally, Williams’ focus and approach to data is, in my opinion, a valid research perspective.
To begin, Neumann, or any other scholar, is in no position to define what the proper research focus and design should be for the entire field of communications. A concept that defines the one proper method to approach television should be viewed with suspicion. It is more likely to be employed to police the boundaries of a discipline rather than guide that discipline in a helpful direction. Williams is writing a book on television that considers intention, which he feels has been neglected by empiricists such as Harold Lasswell who focused on “‘who says what, how, to whom, whit what effect’” (122) but did not consider intent. The role of intent may not be something that can most usefully be studied statistically (which Neuman seems to tacitly assume to be connected to “proper data”). Therefore, we should be suspicious of Neuman’s attack because his focus on data and research methods may conceal a judgment, that only certain questions and ideas of communication should be expressed, those connected to “proper data.”
Second, Neuman’s critique could still possibly be valid if William’s work was fundamental unsound or contained falsified data or a complete lack of logical support. Neuman would be correct if Williams work was completely lacking in evidence or argument, it could then categorically excluded and ignored. Fortunately, this is not the case. If one reads Neuman’s critique without a prior understanding of Williams, one might believe that there is no data in William’s work. This is obviously incorrect, because Williams work contains empirical data. For example, he analyzes the distribution of television programs by hours (81) and then performs two detailed content analyses of the flow of television information (97-120). Furthermore, Williams’ book contains other support for his argument. For example, Williams explores the history of television and its forms (7-38). Williams also engages in a commentary on other approaches to television scholarship (121-138). There are diverse forms of data in Television, and, while this is a subjective opinion, I would suggest that even Neuman, while still believing Williams to be incorrect, would agree that the argument is coherent and sincere. Therefore, this is not a case of poor writing or duplicitous research, and Williams can not be categorically excluded based on his approach to data.
This suggests that Neuman’s argument is not that Williams is unprofessional, but that other methods lead to a better and more sophisticated understanding of communication and that Williams’ approach is invalid. As I have argued above, works should not be categorically ignored because of their approach to data. At the same time, Neuman’s suggestion should be fully considered for a particular work. Each scholar should decide for him or herself if a book or article is methodologically valid. In this case, I still disagree with Neuman’s perspective. Not only is Neuman incorrect to categorically exclude Williams’ style of research, he also is incorrect to define William’s particular data as improper and lacking in utility. One of Williams’ primary arguments is that empirical and statistical approaches to television have isolated the medium and are themselves unscientific (121-124). I support Williams’ approach to data because I believe the best means to challenge science and statistics may not be simply with more statistical science, but through approaches that attempt to place themselves outside of statistical science. This does not mean that statistical science is improper, or “bad data” itself. Indeed, statistical science might also be usefully put to use to critique qualitative approaches to study. A reader should evaluate a work to determine if its method is appropriate and valid. I find William’s approach to be valid because I believe qualitative and theoretical arguments and data are valid, and especially useful as a method to gain new insight into a phenomenon that has previously primarily been studied statistically.
In conclusion, one should be suspicious of an argument that suggests that only certain types of data are valid. Williams’ data and arguments should be categorically excluded only if they are incoherent or lack any support. This is not the case. Therefore, it is up to each scholar to judge William’s perspective based on their own understandings of research and validity. I believe that qualitative and theoretical arguments can be valid, and in this case are. Likewise, Neuman is not incorrect to state that as a researcher, he personally does not accept Williams’ approach and arguments. However, Neuman is incorrect to state that no other scholar can accept or employ an approach similar to Williams and that there can be no followers of Williams because William’s method is unsound. This type of disciplinary policing is unnecessary.